Individual and institutional investors can trade German initial public equity offerings on an as-if/when-issued basis before the start of secondary trading. Using a novel data set of pre-and post-IPO trades made by a sample of clients at a large German retail broker, the paper documents that retail investors both are willing to overpay and end up overpaying for IPOs, especially following periods of high returns in recent new issues. IPOs that are more aggressively bought by retail investors in the pre-IPO market or on the day of the IPO post higher first-day returns, but also experience lower aftermarket returns, controlling for firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market ratio. In short, sentiment -expectations about asset values unwarranted by fundamentals -drives retail purchases of IPOs and appears to have a transitory effect on prices.
Investors looking to invest money -be it for liquidity, risk-sharing, or speculative reasons -have thousands of individual stocks and mutual funds to choose from. Professional investors typically manage this selection task by specializing along some stock characteristic such as size, geographic location, or industry, and by producing and consuming research on these stocks. For retail investors the cost of systematically producing and consuming such research is prohibitive. One possible solution, advocated by traditional finance theory, would be to simply buy and hold the market portfolio, or at least a well-diversified portfolio of stocks. However, the typical retail investor does not; most of those who hold stocks directly hold just a handful of stocks rather than a diversified portfolio (see, e.g., the 1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances).
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The lack of diversification in household portfolios raises the question of which stocks individual investors choose to buy and what motivates the investors to favor one stock over another. Specifically, one can ask whether individual investors act on beliefs unwarranted by fundamental values and thereby affect prices, as conjectured in models of noise trading and investor sentiment (see, e.g., De Long et al. (1990a) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003) ). These questions are challenging to answer, not the least because neither beliefs nor fundamental values are observable; empirical studies of investor sentiment thus have to resort to indirect measures of sentiment, e.g., return-based proxies such as closed-end fund discounts (see Lee et al. (1991) ). This paper addresses the question of whether unrealistic beliefs motivate the decisions of individual investors to purchase initial public equity offerings (IPOs), using a novel data set of brokerage transaction records for a sample of retail clients at a German broker during 1999 and 2000. The focus on IPOs allows me to unambiguously identify individual investor sentiment and formulate a relatively tightly specified test of the hypothesis that such sentiment affects returns.
IPOs are natural candidates for an empirical study of individual investor sentiment and its effects. Sentiment investors can only affect prices if rational investors are unwilling or unable to bet against them. Geczy et al. (2002) present evidence that the cost of borrowing a new issue in the U.S. is substantial because the supply of loanable shares is initially very limited. Moreover, the lead underwriters have an incentive to monitor and punish investors -or syndicate members that allocate shares to investors -who jeopardize the success of IPOs either by directly betting against them in the aftermarket or by enabling others to do so, e.g., by lending them their shares (see Benveniste et al. (1998) ).
Given limits to arbitrage, sentiment should have a greater impact on prices of assets of which sentiment investors collectively own and trade a larger fraction (see De Long et al. (1990a) ). New issues represent a disproportionately large fraction of the observed brokerage clients' holdings and trades. By March 2000, stocks listed on Germany's Neuer Markt -the market segment for growth and technology stocks on which most IPOs choose to list -represent almost one third of the sample brokerage portfolio in German stocks, three times the combined weight of Neuer Markt stocks in the German market portfolio; brokerage trading volume in Neuer Markt stocks accounts for more than half of the total brokerage trading volume in German stocks (see Figures 1 and   2 ). Falkenstein (1996) documents that U.S. mutual funds -large institutional investors -shun new listings, which is consistent with individual investors playing a relatively important role as owners and traders of new issues.
German IPOs are particularly interesting to examine because individual and institutional investors can trade new equity issues before official trading starts in a pre-IPO or when-issued market, known in German as "Graumarkt-Handel" or "Handel per Erscheinen" (see, e.g., Löffler et al. (2002) , Pichler and Stomper (2003) , and Cornelli et al. (2003) ). Essentially, pre-IPO transactions are forward trades -bets -on the opening-day price of the IPO. The outcome of the bet is revealed when the first price is established in official trading, less than four business days after a typical pre-IPO transaction. The propensity of retail investors to bet in the pre-IPO market and the price at which they enter into the bet allows me to characterize their beliefs about the stock's value and therefore to construct a direct measure of individual investor sentiment.
The first contribution of the paper is to identify the determinants of retail purchases of IPOs. Past returns in recent new issues are the single best predictor of retail investor interest in IPOs; individual investors appear to be positive feedback traders of IPOs (see De Long et al. (1990b) and Derrien (2003) ). Controlling for past returns, the sample investors fail to display strong preferences for glamor stocks -stocks with high marketto-book ratios -or hightech or internet stocks. Contrary to the conjecture by Shiller (1988) , underwriter reputation as measured by the market share of the lead underwriter also fails to explain variation in retail investor interest in an IPO. Pre-and post-IPO purchases are strongly positively correlated even though pre-IPO buyers hardly ever become post-IPO buyers in the same IPO. This suggests that retail investors in the pre-and post-IPO markets are driven by the same signals. By itself, however, the propensity to buy in response to past returns does not imply that individual investors erroneously form extrapolative expectations about IPOs.
The second contribution of the paper is to show that retail IPO investors indeed form overly optimistic beliefs in response to high returns in similar stocks. Retail participants in the when-issued market buy at prices that are typically 10% above the opening price in official trading and more than twice the offer price. Their willingness to pay a when-issued premium, i.e., to buy at pre-IPO prices that are consistently above prices established in the secondary market, cannot be explained by an inability to get shares in the aftermarket, higher transaction costs in the aftermarket, or rational beliefs that the shares can be sold at a profit to a "greater fool". Retail investors lose in the when-issued market not because they systematically bet on the wrong stocks, however, but because they bet at all; the propensity of retail investors to buy in the when-issued market is unrelated to the size of the when-issued premium. Thus, retail investors lose the most in the IPOs they most aggressively buy in the pre-IPO market. The beneficiaries of individual investor sentiment are institutional investors who tend to be on the sell side of the pre-IPO trades and the pre-IPO broker dealers who quote spreads that are considerably higher than the spreads quoted in the aftermarket.
There is no shortage of models populated by investors that exhibit sentiment some of the time. In the IPO context, for example, and Rajan and Servaes (2003) model IPO pricing assuming that a fraction of the investors are too optimistic about the prospects of the firm going public. Both papers contend that the time-varying presence of irrationally exuberant investors can help understand the firm's decision to go public, the pricing and allocation of its shares, and the subsequent performance of its shares -the three areas of IPO research laid out by Ritter and Welch (2002) . Prior empirical support for this crucial assumption, however, is largely confined to indirect measures such as the correlation between aggregate issuing volume and closed-end fund discounts (see, e.g., Lee et al. (1991) and Lowry (2003) ).
The third contribution of the paper is to present evidence consistent with individual investor sentiment pushing aftermarket prices temporarily above their fundamental levels. Aggressive pre-and post-IPO purchases are associated with high returns initiallyfirst-day returns measured from the offer price to the first price in aftermarket trading are positively correlated with retail investor interest -but followed by lower subsequent returns; IPOs belonging to the tercile of IPOs most aggressively bought by retail investors significantly underperform IPOs shunned by retail investors, and lag an average 27% behind the performance of a size-and market-to-book ratio-matched portfolio of German stocks during the first year after the IPO.
The conjecture isn't new that prices reflect over-optimistic beliefs of some investors when other investors cannot fully express their pessimistic opinion because of short-sale constraints (see Miller (1977) ); in support of Miller's conjecture, Chen et al. (2002) and Diether et al. (2002) document a negative relation between measures of differences of opinion and subsequent returns. There is little direct evidence, however, that individual investor sentiment affects prices. Kumar and Lee (2002) find a positive correlation between buy-sell imbalances of a sample of U.S. discount brokerage clients calculated for portfolios of stocks and monthly returns of those portfolios. Ofek and Richardson (2003) find that high first-day returns of internet IPOs are associated with lesser aftermarket participation by institutional investors as measured by the absence of block trading; they argue that a lower ratio of block trading to total trading volume is associated with a higher probability that overoptimistic retail investors are the marginal investors. Derrien (2003) documents that IPO subscriptions by individual investors in French IPOs are positively related to underpricing and negatively related to subsequent returns.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Next is a description of the brokerage transaction records and the sample IPOs. Section Two introduces the essential features of the when-issued market in equity IPOs listing on German stock exchanges. Sections Three and Four, the main parts of the paper, analyze determinants of retail purchases of IPOs and explore whether individual investor sentiment affects prices. Section Five concludes.
I. Data A. Transaction records
A proprietary data set of daily transaction records is available for a random sample of roughly half the client population at a large German retail broker 3 who opened their accounts before July 1999; the transaction records encompass all the trades made from the date the account is opened until the date the account is closed or May 31, 2000, whichever comes first. During the sample period considered in this paper -August 1, 1999 until May 31, 2000 -almost 23,000 clients out of a sample total of 34,000 active clients trade German stocks at least once. The typical transaction record consists of a unique identification number, an account number, a transaction date, a buy/sell indicator, the type of asset traded (e.g., common stock), a security identification code, the number of shares traded, the gross transaction value, the transaction fees, and a code identifying the exchange where the order is placed.
The sample of observed brokerage clients is, if only by virtue of its size, fairly representative of the population of German discount or online brokerage customers. The five largest German online brokers reported 750,000 accounts held at the end of 1999 (see Van Steenis and Ossig (2000) ); the sample thus represents roughly 5% of the German discount brokerage population. In comparison, there were 3.8 million German retail investors directly holding stocks other than company stock at the end of 1999 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2000) ).
B. Sample IPOs
The paper focuses on 79 German IPOs for which pre-IPO trading by the sample investors is observed. To be eligible for pre-IPO trading through the retail broker, a firm has to go public after August 1, 1999 and list on either the official segment or the Neuer Markt segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Moreover, the retail broker only offers pre-IPO trading in issues that are underwritten neither by the retail broker nor by financial institutions affiliated with the retail broker. The information on the sample IPOs used in this paper is hand-collected from the offering prospectuses and checked against as well as complemented by data on the website of Deutsche Börse under the heading "Primary 
II. Essential features of the pre-IPO market
Individual and institutional investors can trade new equity issues to be listed on German stock exchanges in a when-issued market, from when the filing range has been determined until the day before the IPO. Figure 3 gives an overview of the sequence of events leading up to the IPO date. For some issues, pre-IPO trading takes place after the offer price has been set (see, e.g., Cornelli et al. (2003) ). Pre-IPO trades are forward trades in which the seller promises to deliver IPO shares in exchange for being paid the prevailing price in the when-issued market. There are two independent pre-IPO broker-dealers who make a market in pre-IPO contracts and allow retail investor participation. Schnigge, the larger of the two pre-IPO brokers, claims to account for 80% of the pre-IPO trading volume
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In 1999, the second pre-IPO broker, Lang & Schwarz, emerged with an electronic pre-IPO platform allowing retail investors to place their pre-IPO orders online. Pre-IPO brokers settle trades like regular trades on the first trading day, i.e., physical delivery takes place two business days after the IPO. If an IPO were to be cancelled so would be all pre-IPO orders.
A unique feature of the when-issued market is that, for any trading to occur, institutions need to go net short; retail investors are de facto restricted from shorting when-issued shares, although they can sell when-issued shares that they have previously purchased. By contrast, institutions face fewer short sale constraints in the whenissued market than in regular trading: in the when-issued market, they can sell securities without owning them or locating someone who does and incurring borrowing costs. Any remaining short positions can be covered out of IPO allocations or by buying the IPO on the first trading day. This implies that a seller in the pre-IPO market is likely to be an institutional investor. By contrast, most of the pre-IPO purchases are made by retail investors; in private communications with the author, executives of the two major pre-IPO broker-dealers Lang & Schwarz and Schnigge (Jörg Schwarz, CEO of Lang & Schwarz, and Norbert Empting, head of when-issued trading at Schnigge), independently estimated retail investors to account for the majority of when-issued purchases.
Oftentimes, however, the pre-IPO broker-dealer does not need to guess who he is trading with; because orders from retail brokerage clients are routed through the retail broker, the pre-IPO broker can tell whether he is approached by retail investors and whether the retail investors want to buy or sell. Appendix A provides further institutional aspects of when-issued trading.
III. What drives retail purchases of IPOs?
A. Summary of retail trading activity in IPOs In absolute terms, both pre-IPO purchases and day-one purchases are higher during February-May 2000. However, as a fraction of total issue volume, pre-IPO purchases are smaller during the second subperiod. The average ratio of day-one purchases to total issue volume is similar during the two subperiods. of shares purchased before, either in the aftermarket (i.e., on the same day) or in the when-issued market or in the primary market. Although the sample investors cannot subscribe to any of the 79 IPOs through the retail broker, a small fraction of them manage to get allocations in a handful of IPOs through other channels. One possibility is the participation in a so-called "share-plus-IPO" program where the retail investor buys shares of an underwriting institution A and receives preferred IPO allocations e.g., one IPO share for every 100 shares of A held. For the purpose of this paper -and because such purchases are at the discretion of the retail investor -these transactions are considered post-IPO purchases. Omitting them does not qualitatively change the results reported in the paper. Retail participation broadens during the remainder of the first month after the IPO date; almost 4,000 sample investors -corresponding to 17.5% of the brokerage population trading German stocks -trade one or more of the 79 sample IPOs. Figure 5 shows that retail trading of the sample IPOs is concentrated on the day of the IPO. On average, the brokerage clients purchase 0.2% of the issue size on the first day of the IPO; by contrast, the ratio of net purchases during the pre-IPO trading period divided by issue size averages 0.08% and the corresponding ratios calculated for the remainder of the first month, days 2-27 after the IPO, are lower still. While the concentration of net purchases on the day of the IPO is remarkable, the exponential decline in daily trading volume is consistent with aggregate trading volume patterns documented by Krigman et al. (1999) for U.S. IPOs.
B. Determinants of retail purchases of IPOs
Although retail participation in the pre-and post-IPO trading of IPOs is fairly evenly spread across the sample period, retail interest, measured as net purchases divided by issue size, varies considerably across IPOs. Exploring the determinants of that variation is a first step in answering whether sentiment drives the retail interest in IPOs.
Traditional finance theory makes the simple prediction and recommendation that investors buy and hold the market portfolio of assets. Consequently, the market capitalization of an IPO should be the only variable needed to explain IPO purchases. Even though the typical sample investor is anything but a buy-and-hold investor -he holds only a handful of stocks and trades them frequently -firm size could still be positively correlated with retail purchases of IPOs. By definition, investors can only buy shares in a firm they or their fund managers know about; other things equal, larger companies get more press coverage and a greater analyst following and are thus more likely to catch the eye of individual and institutional investors. Barber and Odean (2002) Based on survey responses from individual investors who had previously participated in IPOs, Shiller (1988) outlines two hypotheses regarding retail participation in IPOs: the underwriter reputation or certification hypothesis and the impresario hypothesis.
Survey participants report making their decision of whether or not to invest in an IPO contingent on the quality of the underwriter. The rationale is that individual investors are aware of information asymmetries between themselves and the issuer, and that they rely on the underwriter to certify the issuer's quality. Column (1) of Table III reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the logarithm of gross pre-IPO purchases on firm and offer characteristics as well as market conditions at the time of the IPO. All regressors are calculated based on information publicly available at the start of bookbuilding, i.e., the beginning of the when-issued market. Standard errors are adjusted for the time clustering of observations; it is assumed that observations are independent for firms that go public in different months, but not necessarily for firms that go public in the same month.
The one-month lagged return of an index of Neuer Markt stocks (Nemax) is the single most important explanatory variable; a monthly Nemax return one-standard deviation above its average is associated with 50% greater retail purchases in the pre-IPO market.
When both the lagged returns of the DAX 100, the index of the 100 largest German stocks, and the lagged returns of the Nemax in excess of the DAX 100 are included as regressors (results not reported), both coefficients are positive, but only the coefficient on the Nemax excess returns is significant; retail demand for IPOs is primarily driven by the performance of similar stocks relative to the overall stock market. Firm size, defined as the total number of shares times the midpoint of the filing range, appears to be positively associated with retail purchases in the pre-IPO market; an IPO whose market capitalization is one standard deviation above average attracts 30% more purchases by the sample investors. The sample investors tend to bet on companies whose sales have grown more rapidly before the IPO but fail to display a preference for internet or glamour stocks, i.e., stocks with high market-to-book ratios. They do not seem to be concerned about certification by a prestigious underwriter or financial investor; retail purchases in the pre-IPO market are unrelated to the presence of a financial investor and the market share of the lead underwriter during the period March 1997 -July 1999 as measured by the number of IPOs that the investment bank underwrote as a lead.
The correlation between pre-IPO purchases and the lead underwriter's impresario score -the equally-weighted initial returns of IPOs underwritten between March 1997 and July 1999 -is positive, but statistically insignificant. Media coverage -defined as the number of media mentions of the IPO in three widely circulated national newspapers and a financial daily -is significantly positively correlated with retail interest.
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The focus on the 79 IPOs for which pre-IPO trading is observed allows me to consider discretionary purchase decisions by retail investors; in principle, all clients can participate in pre-IPO and aftermarket trading. By contrast, retail participation in the 23
IPOs underwritten by the retail broker or an affiliated institution is partly at the retail broker's discretion. Because all but one of the 23 IPOs are firm-commitment offerings, the underwriter has almost always complete discretion over how to allocate shares in the primary "market". A potential disadvantage of focusing on IPOs for which pre-IPO trading is observed is that the estimated relation between pre-IPO purchases and firm and deal characteristics might suffer from a sample selection bias. There could be an imperfectly observed firm characteristic that affects both the firm's decision whether or not to retain the sample broker or an affiliated institution as an underwriter and the propensity of individual investors to buy the IPO. The two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) offers a way to address the resulting specification issue. More formally, suppose that
where X 1 is the matrix of firm and offer characteristics and market conditions, the selection indicator ∆ is one if the IPO belongs to the sample and zero otherwise, and X 2 is the matrix of the determinants of underwriter choice. Further, assume that u 1 and u 2 are independent of X 1 and X 2 , u 2 has a standard normal distribution, and
Together with these assumptions, equation 1 implies that
where λ(·) ≡ φ(·)/Φ(·) and φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal pdf and cdf. The coefficients β 1 and γ can then be consistently estimated by regressing the logarithm of pre-IPO purchases on X 1 and the estimated inverse Mills ratio λ(β 2 X 2 ), whereβ 2 comes from a probit estimation of equation 2.
To estimate equation 2, I include the determinants of underwriter choice suggested by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) who argue that firms facing greater valuation uncertainty and firms whose insiders would like to sell more equity choose more experienced or prestigious underwriters; firm characteristics such as age, size, and dummy variables to indicate internet and hightech IPOs, as well as offer characteristics such as the participation ratio (the number of secondary shares sold at the IPO normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding), and the dilution factor (the number of primary shares issued normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding). Table IV contains the results of the probit estimation. Other things equal, larger
IPOs and hightech IPOs are less likely to be included in the sample of IPOs for which pre-IPO trading is observed. The negative correlation between firm size and the probability of being included in the sample is intuitive; the offerings of larger firms tend to be underwritten by more banks and also larger banks and it is thus more likely that the retail broker or an affiliated institution is a member of the underwriting syndicate (which in turn precludes pre-IPO participation through the sample brokerage). The tendency of hightech IPOs to be excluded from the pre-IPO sample -because they are underwritten by a major bank and leading underwriter that is affiliated with the retail brokersupports the conjecture that firms facing considerable valuation uncertainty such as hightech firms choose prestigious underwriters.
Column (2) of Table III reports the results of regressing the logarithm of pre-IPO purchases on firm, offer, and market, characteristics as well as the estimated inverse Mills ratio. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant and the coefficients of the other regressors are very similar, both in magnitude and significance, to those obtained from a regression that ignores sample selection.
Column (3) of Table III reports the corresponding results of an OLS regression of the logarithm of gross day-one IPO purchases on firm, offer, and market, characteristics as well as pre-IPO purchases. Pre-and post-IPO purchases are strongly positively correlated; given pre-IPO purchases, past Nemax returns leading up to the beginning of the bookbuilding period no longer help explain additional variation in aftermarket purchases by the sample investors. The strong correlation between pre-and post-IPO purchases is not due to retail buyers in the pre-IPO market also buying in the aftermarket. In fact, only four percent of the pre-IPO purchases are followed by firstday purchases by the same investor. Sample investors also tend to buy IPOs with low debt-to-equity ratios. It is possible that post-IPO buyers demand IPOs in certain industries and that gearing serves as an industry proxy; in the subsample of IPOs with below-median gearing, for example, more than four out of five IPOs come from the internet or hightech sector, twice as many as in the subsample of IPOs with abovemedian gearing. Moreover, retail investors more aggressively buy IPOs underwritten by a lead underwriter whose past deals were more underpriced which lends some support to the impresario hypothesis.
In sum, the sample investors who buy IPOs in the pre-IPO market and the sample investors who buy IPOs on day 1 of the aftermarket trade on similar signals. In particular, retail investors buy IPOs following periods of high returns in the growth and technology stocks listed on Germany's Neuer Markt.
C. Performance of pre-IPO trades
While the positive correlation between past returns in recent new issues and retail purchases of IPOs is suggestive of investors forming exaggerated expectations about the profitability of their investments in new issues, it could also be that retail investors fol-low a variant of a potentially profitable momentum strategy. It is impractical and very difficult to verify either conjecture directly by, for example, asking them.
At a minimum, however, the pre-IPO buyers must think that the stocks they acquire in the when-issued market are well worth the price paid at the time of purchase.
Are they? The first price established in aftermarket trading is a natural point to which when-issued prices paid by the sample investors can be compared. Figure 6 shows a distribution of when-issued returns, defined as the difference between the first price in official trading and the actual when-issued price paid divided by the actual when-issued price paid, based on all 1,191 observed pre-IPO purchases. The striking result is that more than two out of three pre-IPO purchases are made at a price above the first price established in aftermarket trading; the equally-weighted average and median when-issued returns, calculated across all 1,191 pre-IPO purchases, are -8.3% and -11.3% -for an average holding period of five days and before trading commissions. When-issued returns are significantly negative in both economic and statistical terms. The value-weighted average when-issued return across all 1,191 pre-IPO purchases is -8.2%; negative whenissued returns are not driven by small trades. Negative when-issued returns are not due to concentration of pre-IPO trading in a few IPOs either; average pre-IPO purchase prices exceed the first aftermarket price in four out of five IPOs.
In principle, the when-issued premium -the ratio of average pre-IPO purchase price paid by the sample investors to first aftermarket price -could be a liquidity premium;
when-issued markets in U.S. Treasury securities, for example, are extremely liquid (Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) ). If retail trading volume is any indicator of market-wide liquidity, however, it appears that the aftermarket is much more liquid than the whenissued market; average retail trading volume on the first day of the aftermarket is more than thrice the aggregate retail trading volume in the pre-IPO market (see Figure 5 ).
Information on the daily pre-IPO trading volume handled by Schnigge AG, a major when-issued broker-dealer, has been published by the Börsen-Zeitung, a German finan- In principle, it could be that high pre-IPO purchase prices reflect the risk that pre-IPO buyers -primarily retail investors -default on their obligation to put up the cash necessary to settle the purchase with the pre-IPO broker-dealer. Since retail brokers immediately debit purchases from their clients' cash accounts, however, they eliminate the risk that a retail buyer will fail to deliver cash in exchange for the securities (see Appendix A). In principle, institutions that go short in the pre-IPO market could default on their promise to deliver securities on the day of the IPO. (In practice, no party defaults during the sample period according to the pre-IPO broker-dealers.) This cannot explain, however, why retail buyers in the pre-IPO market should be willing to pay a when-issued premium.
Another argument has the retail participants believe that they will not be able to get their orders executed early during the first trading day or at a price close to the opening quote. In other words, it might be unfair to assume that instead of buying in the pre-IPO market, they can wait and buy at the first price established in aftermarket trading. It is reasonable, however, to assume that when-issued participants could have bought or sold at prices at which other retail clients at the same broker are observed to purchase the IPO on the first trading day. Indeed, clients who purchase the IPO on the first day of aftermarket trading pay 1% above the first price, on average. This leaves a when-issued return of less than -7% over four days unexplained, however. Unless whenissued market buyers wrongly expect to always buy at the maximum price paid on the first trading day, transaction costs in the aftermarket cannot explain the when-issued premium.
Buyers in the when-issued market could be willing to pay more for when-issued shares than the fundamental value of the shares because they expect to turn around and sell to someone, a "greater fool", who is willing to pay even more in the when-issued market. Such beliefs underly models of price bubbles (see, e.g., Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) ). For these beliefs to be rational, one should observe that buyers in the when-issued market subsequently sell their shares at a profit, on average. Very few pre-IPO purchases are followed by sales in the pre-IPO market, however (95% of all pre-IPO transactions are purchases). There are 66 instances in which a sample investor both buys and sells pre-IPO shares. Before trading commissions, the equally-weighted average return on such roundtrip transactions is -1.1% which is not significantly different from 0%. Once trading commissions are considered, the average roundtrip return decreases to -2.7% which is significantly negative. If retail buyers in the pre-IPO market really expected to sell to a "greater fool", their expectations would be systematically disappointed.
Rational motives fail to explain why retail investors buy in the pre-IPO market and accept paying a when-issued premium. Rather, the evidence is consistent with retail investors forming overly optimistic expectations after a run-up in prices of stocks that are similar to the IPO. Retail buyers in the pre-IPO market pay an average premium of 100% above the top of the filing range which is never adjusted upwards in German IPOs during the sample period (see Aussenegg et al. (2002) ). In other words, the sample investors bet that the offer price will regularly more than double on the first day of trading; even during the hot issue market of 1999 and 2000, average underpricing "only" hovered around 50%. The willingness to overpay in the pre-IPO market is compelling evidence that sentiment drives the retail demand for IPOs and suggests pre-IPO purchases or trading volume as a proxy for individual investor sentiment.
D. Pre-and post-IPO purchases as a proxy for sentiment
At first glance, the when-issued premium paid by the sample investors appears to be a natural choice as a proxy for individual investor sentiment. Specifically, one might expect that the greater the retail interest in the pre-IPO market, the higher the pre-IPO price relative to the first aftermarket price. Pre-IPO purchases, however, are unrelated to the average when-issued premium paid by retail investors. The lack of correlation can be explained by the ease with which institutional investors can take short positions in the when-issued market. Contrary to shorting in the aftermarket, shorting in the pre-IPO market requires neither posting a margin nor locating someone who actually owns the stock and and paying the lender for his services. Given the absence of explicit limits to arbitrage, one would expect that the pre-IPO price reflects the institutional investors' beliefs about the price the aftermarket is willing to bear. Institutional investors will go short pre-IPO if the pre-IPO selling price is above the price they believe the IPO will fetch in the aftermarket. In this context, it is interesting to note that the average when-issued premium is similar in magnitude to the pre-IPO spread. Assuming that institutions do not systematically err about the post-IPO price, this suggests that institutional sellers in the pre-IPO market typically drive pre-IPO bid prices down to levels close to the first aftermarket price.
Retail investors thus lose their pre-IPO bets not because they bet on the wrong stocks, but because they bet at all. As a group, the sample investors tend to lose the most in the pre-IPO markets of the issues they most aggressively buy. Therefore, the willingness of retail investors to bet on IPOs -measured by gross retail purchases in the pre-IPO markets and on the day of the IPO -is a better proxy for sentiment than the size of the when-issued premium.
IV. Does sentiment affect prices?
The retail investors' willingness to pay a sizable when-issued premium and the strong positive correlation between pre-and post-IPO purchases suggest that retail IPO traders are subject to similar sentiment. Ultimately, however, the interest in the actions of individual investors centers on their potential impact on market outcomes such as prices.
Specifically, one can ask whether unwarranted individual investor optimism temporarily pushes prices above fundamental values.
One way of testing this conjecture is to take a stance on fundamental value. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) value IPOs on the basis of comparable publicly traded firms. They find that new issues valued at the offer price are typically more expensive than their peers and that the most overvalued issues exhibit higher "underpricing" and lower subsequent returns than less overvalued issues.
Alternatively, if overoptimistic sentiment affected prices, one should observe a price increase preceding or accompanying the arrival of sentiment investors. As information about the fundamental value of the company becomes available, e.g., through quarterly earnings reports or insider selling around the expiration of the lock-up period, prices should become better aligned with fundamentals (see Ofek and Richardson (2003) ).
A. Sentiment and underpricing
If overoptimistic retail investors could temporarily affect prices, the price run-up should be greater in IPOs more aggressively bought by retail investors. As the main wave of retail IPO buyers arrives on the day of the IPO, one might expect that aggressive Together with evidence that institutional investors receive favorable allocations in highly underpriced IPOs (Aggarwal et al. (2002) ) and flip their allocations in such hot IPOs more aggressively than retail investors (Aggarwal (2003) ), this suggests that hot IPOs pass from institutional into retail hands in the aftermarket.
The positive relation between underpricing and retail interest in an IPO is indicative of sentiment affecting prices. By itself, however, it does not imply that retail investors cause excessive first-day returns. For example, it could be that individual investors tend to buy IPOs whose owners have less incentives to bargain for reduced underpricing with the underwriter (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) document that differences in the pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior can explain cross-sectional differences in underpricing).
B. Sentiment and longer-run returns
The sentiment hypothesis makes another prediction that can be tested more cleanly; if individual investor overoptimism pushed prices above fundamental values, one should eventually observe a price reversal when incontrovertible evidence turns up that fails to justify the lofty valuations. In particular, this prediction does not depend on the discretionary allocation and price setting by the underwriter.
Panel B of Table V Norli (2001)). Neither variable is significant. While underpricing tends to be negatively correlated with subsequent excess returns, the inclusion of underpricing does not change the observed negative correlation between retail IPO purchases and subsequent excess returns.
One might be concerned that the relation between retail IPO purchases and aftermarket returns is tainted by a sample selection bias. In principle, an imperfectly observed firm characteristic that matters for sample selection could also be a proxy for the exposure to a priced risk factor (firms with certain risk exposures might decide to retain the major underwriter affiliated with the sample broker because the underwriter has a special expertise in evaluating those exposures, for example). Again, I rely on the idea put forth in Heckman (1979) to control for a possible selection bias.
To fix ideas, consider the model
where r t,t+T is the aftermarket return of an IPO between time t and t + T in excess Table IV ;
Column (4) of Table VI It is interesting to note that only the IPOs most aggressively bought by retail investors in the pre-IPO and aftermarket underperform their size and market-to-book matched portfolios. These findings suggest that individual investor sentiment can help explain the huge first-day returns and subsequent underperformance of some IPOs during the hot issue period in the late 1990s.
While the narrow scope of the investigation limits the inferences one can draw about the more general role of sentiment as a driver of individual investor behavior and its price effects, it allows a tight characterization of individual investor sentiment. It would be interesting to see whether the present findings are specific to the sample firms and period, or whether they carry over to other settings in which individual investor behavior is directly observed.
A. Institutional aspects of when-issued trading
The major difference between when-issued markets in split stocks, spinoffs (see e.g., Ezzell et al. (2001) or Nayar and Rozeff (2001) ), or government bonds (see Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) ) on the one hand, and IPOs on the other, is the lack of good substitutes for IPOs. There are few instances of when-issued markets in equity IPOs and the German market is by far the most active (see Cornelli et al. (2003) ). There are preopening periods lasting one and a half hours before the start of regular trading on the Paris bourse and on the NASDAQ. There also is a five-minute preopening window before actual trading begins in NASDAQ IPOs. During all of these relatively short preopening periods, however, the quotes entered are merely indicative; no actual trading takes place (see Biais et al. (1999) and Aggarwal and Conroy (2000)).
A. Trading rules, settlement, and delivery
In principle, when-issued transactions are binding conditional on the IPO taking place and settled and delivered like regular transactions in new issues occurring on the opening day, i.e., settled at the then prevailing price and delivered two business days after the opening day. Pre-IPO buyers and sellers contract with the pre-IPO broker-dealer rather than directly with each other. There is a settlement asymmetry, however, between individual and institutional investors: institutional investors can approach the whenissued broker directly and trades are settled as described. Individual investors have to go through a retail broker who typically "settles" purchases immediately by debiting the purchase price from the investor's account. This effectively reduces the risk that a retail buyer will fail to deliver cash in exchange for the securities. The actual securities are not booked into the investor's account until two business days after the IPO.
Retail investors face de facto short sale constraints in the IPO when-issued market:
although there are no explicit legal restrictions banning retail investors from short-selling IPOs or other publicly traded securities, almost all German brokers -pointing to the unlimited downside risk associated with short selling -typically restrict their retail clients from taking short positions; purchases of puts are an exception.
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By contrast, institutions are not restricted from short selling, in fact, they face fewer short sale constraints in the when-issued market than in regular trading: in the when-issued market, they can sell securities without owning them, locating someone who does, incurring borrowing costs, and posting a margin. In other words, the pre-IPO broker-dealer allows institutions to go net short on a promise (which appears to be honored without exception during the sample period). Any remaining short positions can be covered out of IPO allocations or by buying the IPO on the first trading day. In order for trade to occur in the when-issued market, it is thus necessary that institutional investors short securities.
B. Legal framework
There are no specific legal provisions governing over-the-counter trading in Germany.
In general, when-issued trading is subject to the German Securities Trading Act (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (2001)). Paragraph 14 of this Act prohibits investors from trading on, selectively disclosing, or recommending a transaction based on insider information where insider information is defined as "[...] information which has not been made public relating to one or more issuers of insider securities, or to insider securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the insider security." New issues are considered "insider securities" during the bookbuilding period and the order book data available to the underwriters qualifies as insider information. Moreover, Paragraph 88 of the German Stock Exchange Act sanctions attempts to influence securities prices by misleading investors. In the absence of any legal precedent, Krämer and Hess (1999) argue that, e.g., underwriters submitting inflated when-issued purchase orders or generating artificially high when-issued trading volume, would be covered by the existing legislation.
In practice, when-issued brokers preclude members of the underwriting consortium from directly participating in when-issued trading. Moreover, underwriting banks typ- investors make choices that are at odds with finance theory; they allocate a substantial fraction of their discretionary retirement funds to company stock (see Benartzi (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002) ).
2 High oversubscription rates by individual investors need not signal that these investors are irrational, however. In fact, Derrien (2003) shows that a naive bidding strategy available to individual investors -bidding for the maximum number of shares in IPOs following periods of high market returns (those IPOs that are most heavily oversubscribed) -would have been profitable in his sample.
3 The broker could also be labelled as a "discount" broker because no investment advice is given, or as an "online" broker since its clients can place orders through the internet, in addition to the traditional phone channel.
4 See http : //www.schnigge. de/var/99gb000602.pdf , last viewed April 14, 2002 . 5 Shiller (1988 also notes that the majority of the survey respondents professed not to have conducted any fundamental research on the IPOs they bought.
6 The interpretation of this result depends on what in detail led to the press coverage. For example, it is difficult to disentangle the two following stories implying the opposite causality: it could be that press coverage of company news generates retail demand, but it could also be that journalists want to write about companies of interest to investors and are good at gauging that interest. J a n -9 7 M a r -9 7 M a y -9 7 J u l -9 7 S e p -9 7 N o v -9 7 J a n -9 8 M a r -9 8 M a y -9 8 J u l -9 8 S e p -9 8 N o v -9 8 J a n -9 9 M a r -9 9 M a y -9 9 J u l -9 9 S e p -9 9 N o v -9 9 J a n -0 0 M a r -0 0 M a y -0 0 brokerage allocation to NEMAX stocks as a fraction of all German stocks market allocation to NEMAX stocks as a fraction of all German stocks J a n -9 7 M a r -9 7 M a y -9 7 J u l -9 7 S e p -9 7 N o v -9 7 J a n -9 8 M a r -9 8 M a y -9 8 J u l-9 8 S e p -9 8 N o v -9 8 J a n -9 9 M a r -9 9 M a y -9 9 J u l-9 9 S e p -9 9 N o v -9 9 J a n -0 0 M a r -0 0 M a y -0 0 A u g -9 9 S e p -9 9 O c t -9 9 N o v -9 9 D e c -9 9 J a n -0 0 Participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the IPO normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. Dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. Initial return is the hypothetical return from buying at the offer or subscription price and selling at the first price in secondary market trading. Subsequent abnormal return is the return from buying a stock on day 28 after the IPO and holding it until day 364 after the IPO minus the buy-and-hold return on the DAX 100, a broad stock market index consisting of the 100 biggest German stocks. Asterisks indicate whether the mean or median of a firm characteristic differs significantly between the two samples. Note: ***/**/* corresponds to statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. (1) (1) and (2), ln (IPO-day purchases [DEM] ) is the dependent variable in regression (3)) on a set of firm and deal characteristics as well as market conditions at the time of the IPO. Unless otherwise noted, the regressors are defined in Table I . Out of the 79 sample IPOs, four are dropped because sales growth cannot be calculated using the prospectus data. Underwriter reputation is the IPO market share of the lead underwriter during March 1997 -July 1999 as proxied by the number of IPOs the investment bank underwrote as a lead during that period. The impresario index is the equally-weighted average underpricing of IPOs underwritten by the lead underwriter during March 1997 -July 1999. Past Nemax return is the return of the value-weighted index of Neuer Markt stocks during the month before the start of bookbuilding (available from Datastream), and the number of media mentions is the number of times an IPO is mentioned in three widely circulated national daily newspapers -the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Tageszeitung -as well as a financial daily -the Börsen-Zeitung -during the month before the start of bookbuilding. The bias correction term is the estimated inverse Mills ratio calculated from a probit estimation of the determinants of sample selection reported in Table IV . All accounting variables are taken from the offering prospectus, a preliminary form of which is publicly available at the beginning of the bookbuilding period. Data on underwriters is gathered from the primary markets website of Deutsche Börse. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and time clustering; it is assumed that observations are independent for firms that go public in different months, but not necessarily for firms that go public in the same month. Note: ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
(1) The dependent variable in this probit regression is the sample selection indicator ∆ that is one if pre-ipo trading is observed for an IPO and zero otherwise. The regressors are defined in Table I . Four out of 102 observations/IPOs are dropped because sales growth cannot be calculated using prospectus data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Note: ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The table presents aftermarket return statistics for IPOs sorted by the retail investor interest they attract. Retail interest is the logarithm of the sum of gross pre-ipo purchases and post-ipo purchases on the first day of aftermarket trading. Nemax stands for the Nemax AllShare Index, an index of all stocks that list on the Neuer Markt, the segment for growth and technology stocks of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The reference portfolio adjustment is calculated as follows: based on its market capitalization and market-to-book value calculated at the end of the first month after the IPO, the IPO is assigned to a group of German stocks with similar size and market-to-book value characteristics. IPOs become available as benchmark stocks after the first month after the IPO. The reference portfolio return is the value-weighted return of the matching portfolio; a disappearance of a reference portfolio member, e.g., due to a delisting, is treated as a sale and the proceeds are reinvested in the remaining portfolio members. The asterisks in Column (4) indicate whether the means of Columns (1) and (3) differ significantly from each other. Asterisks in Columns (1)-(3) indicate whether the means are significantly different from zero. Note: ***/**/* corresponds to statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
(1) The table summarizes the relation between pre-ipo and day-one purchases of IPOs by the sample investors and (1) IPO returns between (calendar) day 28 and day 364 after the IPO in excess of returns of the Nemax (the index of stocks trading on the Neuer Markt) and (2)- (4) IPO returns between day 28 and day 364 in excess of the returns earned by a portfolio of German stocks with similar size and market-to-book characteristics as the IPO. Unless otherwise mentioned, the regressors are defined in Table I . Turnover is the average daily number of shares traded during calender days 14-27 after the IPO as reported by Datastream, divided by the total number of shares outstanding from the offering prospectus. The bias correction term is the estimated inverse Mills ratio calculated from a probit estimation of the determinants of sample selection reported in Table IV . Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of the coefficient estimates are similar when adjusted for the relatively small sample size by the HC3 variant proposed by MacKinnon and White (1985) . Note: ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
(1) 16.9%
